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While there aremany definitions and conceptual accounts of ‘persuasion’ andother forms
of social influence, social scientists lack empirical insight into how and when people
actually use terms like ‘persuade’, ‘convince’, ‘change somebody’smind’ –whatwe call the
vocabularies of social influence – in actual social interaction. We collected instances of the
spontaneous use of these and other social influence terms (such as ‘schmoozing’ and
‘hoodwinking’) in face-to-face and telephone conversations across multiple domestic and
institutional settings. The recorded data were transcribed and analysed using discursive
psychology and conversation analysis with a focus on the actions accomplished in and
through the use of social influence terms.We found thatwhen speakers use ’persuading’ –
but not ’convincing’ or ’changing somebody’s mind’ – it is in the service of orienting to the
moral accountability of influencing others. The specificity with which social actors deploy
these terms demonstrates the continued importance of developing our understandings of
themeaning ofwords – especially psychological ones – via their vernacular use byordinary
people in the first instance, rather than have psychologists reify, operationalize, and build
an architecture for social psychology without paying attention to what people actually do
with the ‘psychological thesaurus’.
As a cornerstone topic of social psychology, persuasion has been the focus of theoretical
and empirical work for decades. To date, scholars of persuasion do not agree on how to
definepersuasion (Gass&Seiter, 2018), nor onwhere it sitswithin the social influence (SI)
landscape.Whilemuch iswritten aboutwhat ‘persuading’ somebodymeans, and about its
relationshipwith other terms such as ‘convincing’ (Miller, 2012), ‘coercing’ (Schein et al.,
1961), or ‘compliance-seeking’ (Sanders & Fitch, 2001), instead of providing conceptual
clarity, these often-incompatible reflections create confusion. We suggest that a different
starting point – one that builds off the vernacular use of SI categories –may open up new
ways of understanding persuasion.
Drawing on a large data set of audio and video recordings of naturally occurring
interactions from domestic and institutional settings, we use conversation analysis (CA)
and discursive psychology (DP) to shed empirical light on how SI vocabularies are
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employed spontaneously in naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. We analyse cases that
include not only terms and phrases that psychologists have already explored, such as
‘persuading’, ‘convincing’, and ‘changing somebody’s mind’, but also categories such as
‘schmoozing’ and ‘hoodwinking’, which, despite being in common usage, are the kinds of
vernacular starting points that are not typically adopted, and operationalized, in research.
This paper contributes to discursive psychology’s project of examining psychological
predicates in talk-in-interaction, through ‘[a] conceptual analysis of language in use and
[an] empirical study of how people talk within cultural settings’ (Edwards, 1999, p. 288).
Although we are not the first to consider the value of studying the semantic landscape of
social influence (see, for instance,Miller, 2012), our study is – to thebest of our knowledge
– the only one to take an empirical approach to this task, by scrutinizing the spontaneous
use of SI vocabularies in real talk. We treat the flexibility and variability in speakers’ use of
SI categories not as a flaw of discourse, but as a resource that individuals exploit as they
build courses of social action. Our analysis will show that speakers use different SI terms
for systematically different purposes. These purposes are related to the fact that
influencing another person involves curtailing their autonomy, thus producing a moral
dilemma or some accountability on the part of the influencer. We found that speakers
managed these interests by deploying different SI categories that construct influencers as
more or less entitled to direct influencees’ courses of action.
We start by reviewing extant reflections on the meaning of persuasion and other SI
categories, which go back as far as to the 18th century, and originate not only fromwithin
psychology, but also from philosophy and literature.
Theoretical reflections on what is and what is not persuasion
As noted above, scholars do not agree about how specific lexical items map onto
conceptual distinctions among SI categories. ‘Persuasion’, in particular, has amassed over
twenty definitions (Gass & Seiter, 2004). It occupies a crowded conceptual space in
psychology, making it difficult to be precise aboutwhat counts as persuasion: ‘Some of its
aliases include terms such as advising, brainwashing, coercion, compliance-gaining,
convincing, education, indoctrination, influence, manipulation, and propaganda’
(Gass & Seiter, 2018, p. 73, emphasis in original). Moreover, from attempting to identify
the constituent words, phrases, and actions of persuasive practices, in institutional
settingswhere ‘persuasion’ – shifting someone from one robustly held stance to another –
is often the raison d’etre for the interaction (Huma, Stokoe, & Sikveland, 2019), we
identified one particular endogenous hurdle to studying persuasion: people involved in
doing it work hard to camouflage their agenda. In other words, people rely on the
‘defeasibility’ of social actions to deny that persuasion iswhat they are doing (cf. Edwards,
2005; Speer, 2017).
Within the semantic landscape of social influence – a psychological category often
used as an ‘umbrella term’ to refer to a range of interpersonal actions that shape another’s
conduct – there is a widespread consensus about the distinction between persuasion and
a few other SI categories. For instance, it is widely accepted that ’manipulation’, unlike
’persuasion’, advances the influencers’ agenda (Harre, 1985) and relies on misleading the
influencees (Billig&Marinho, 2014). ’Coercing’ somebody differs from ’persuading’ them
because the former relies on implicit or explicit threats and leads to strictly restricting the
influencee’s freedom to respond (Kaposi, 2017). However, distinguishing ’persuasion’
from other SI categories is not always straightforward.
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The relationship between ’persuasion’ and ’conviction’ is probably one of the oldest
and most debated distinctions. Among the first scholars to address this issue, Rousseau
(1762/2002) differentiated between them on the basis of two inter-related features: (1)
the type of argument used and (2) the type of response engendered by the influence
attempt. Persuasion supposedlymobilizes people to action by appealing to their emotions
(but see Diggs, 1964 for a different position), while conviction uses reason to change
people’s minds about a particular state of affairs. In their Treatise on Argumentation,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) propose a different semantic division of labour:
they use ‘persuasion’ to refer to arguments tailored to a specific audience and ‘conviction’
to designate argumentation which holds true for any individual.
Within psychology, similar to Rosseau (1762/2002), Miller (2012) tracked a
longstanding distinction between ‘being persuaded’ and ‘being convinced’ on the basis
of the emotional versus logical strategies through which influencing attempts are
implemented. He then went on to challenge the clear-cut separation between the two SI
categories, by highlighting that all persuasive language could have emotional overtones.
Kapferer (2002) also differentiated between ‘being persuaded’ and ‘being convinced’. He
remarked that, in French, the latter connotes a more socially acceptable outcome, while
the former phrase is often avoided due to the embarrassment associatedwith succumbing
to another person’s influence: ‘Persuasion is perceived as a defeat, as misleading, as
bowing to another; it means accepting the power of another who controls me’ (Kapferer,
2002, p. 21). This line of thought highlights the moral dimension of social influence and
presses for an answer to the question: Is persuasion a moral pursuit? So far, scholars of
persuasion have argued for the neutrality of persuasion (Cialdini, 1999; Diggs, 1964)
claiming it is an amoral means which can be used for either honourable or nefarious ends.
But, as our analysis will reveal, persuading others is actually treated as a morally
accountable undertaking, and not a neutral action such as, say, asking, advising, ormaking
recommendations.
The debate regarding the partial semantic overlap between ‘persuading’ and
‘convincing’ has also been taken up in various media outlets (see Heffer, 2010; Shovel,
2011). One argument for the disambiguation of these terms can be traced back to their
grammar (Bryson, 2002; Johns, 1991). While ‘persuade’ often collocates with an action
verb, such as ‘The cold caller persuaded me to change my energy provider’, ‘convince’ is
regularly followed by an objective statement such as ‘The cold caller convinced me that
the new energy provider has cheaper rates’. However, as our analysis reveals (see Extract
5), the semantics of ‘convincing’ are not grammatically bound to the association with
statements.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed reflections on the semantics of SI
categories. First, these conceptual analyses reveal core issues for persuasion scholars,
such as logical versus emotional arguments and changing a person’s mind and/or their
behaviour. But, as we discover through our analysis of vernacular uses of SI categories,
these are notmembers’ concernswhen discussing social influence as a practical matter in
everyday life. Second, extant conceptual analyses of SI vocabularies are not informed by a
systematic scrutiny of actual occasions in which the terms have been used; therefore,
there is no empirical basis on which to adjudicate between competing definitions. Third,
the criteria used to differentiate between SI categories often take the argumentative action
out of context or unduly focus on some aspects of the communicative conduct while
ignoring others. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) highlight: ‘the difference
between the terms convincing and persuading is always unprecise and in practice must
remain so’ (p. 29, italics in original). This observation is taken one step further by
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discursive psychologywhich treats psychological predicates as ‘flexible, notmerely in the
sense of containing non-central members and having fuzzy boundaries, but in the sense of
taking meaning indexically, and in indefinitely many specific ways, from contexts of
situated use’ (Edwards, 1991, p. 517). It is this situatedmeaning-in-usewhichwe examine
empirically in this paper, in the tradition established by discursive psychology, which we
briefly outline next.
Discursive Psychology’s project of studying the ‘psychological thesaurus’
Discursive psychologists treat individuals’ thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or memories as
practical matters dealt with in and through talk-in-interaction and not as private cognitive
processes that presumably precede, underpin, and direct human conduct (Edwards &
Potter, 1992). Psychological predicates – terms and phrases commonly used to refer to
mental processes, states, and traits – make up a subset of the resources that individuals
draw on when managing everyday practical issues.
Discursive psychology’s treatment of psychological predicates resonates with Mills’s
(1940) seminal argument that vocabularies of motive (e.g., accounts, justifications, and
reasons) have a coordinating not a referential function and, thus, are organized by
interactional not cognitive structures. Discursive psychologists were also influenced, in
their treatment of language, by ordinary language philosophers such as Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1986), who has argued against the existence of a private language, and
Gilbert Ryle (2009), who has disputed the mind–body dualism. While also drawing on
Wittgensteinian philosophy, Coulter’s conceptual analysis of ‘the mind in action’, which
aims to uncover the rules that govern the proper use of cognitive predicates, is different
and, on occasion, at odds with DP’s empirical examination of psychological predicates
(Coulter, 1999, 2004; Potter & Edwards, 2003). Unlike DP, Coulter’s (1989, 1999)
praxeological approach discounts the diversity and variability which characterize
everyday usage of psychological predicates and reproves their referential use in ordinary
conversations. Discursive psychologists, in turn, hold that if we come across variations or
contradictionswithin discourse, it ‘is preciselywhatwe need to study’ (Edwards, 1999, p.
272).
A key finding across empirical DP studies of the vernacular use of psychological
predicates has been their immense flexibility and rhetorical affordances lending them the
potential to be worked up in conjunction with other conversational resources to achieve
nuanced interactional effects in situ. For example, examining emotion discourse,
Edwards (1999) illustrates how emotion categories can be deployed to construct an
individual’s behaviour as a transient reaction to a triggering event (‘I was boiling at this
stage and I was real angry with Connie’) (p. 274), but also as an enduring personality trait
(‘He was a jealous person’) (idem). Edwards’s approach embraces the apparently
inconsistent uses of emotion categories showing that and how speakers exploit the
inherent flexibility, ambiguity, and defeasibility of psychological predicates for particular
interactional effects.
DP research has documented the rhetorical and interactional effects of the occasioned
use of psychological predicates (Potter & Edwards, 2003), revealing, for example: how
callers use displays of concern to justify calling a child protection helpline (Potter &
Hepburn, 2003), how individuals report ‘first thoughts’ to strengthen the credibility of
stories of anomalous events (Jefferson, 2004a), or how speakers preface dispreferred
responses with honesty phrases to foreground their sincerity and integrity (Edwards &
Fasulo, 2006). Furthermore, prospective clients are more likely to agree to mediation
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when they are asked if they arewilling, not if they are interested to mediate (Sikveland &
Stokoe, 2016) and persons threatening to commit suicide more often accept police
negotiator’s proposals to speak than to talk to them (Sikveland & Stokoe, in press). By
showing that sometimes even a single word can make a difference in the outcome of an
interaction, discursive psychologists have demonstrated the importance of paying close
attention to vocabularies in vernacular language.
Participants’ lexical choices often display their orientations to a situated moral order
and illuminate alternative inferences about situated rights, responsibilities, duties, and
rules that are applicable to the situation at hand (Cromdal & Tholander, 2012). For
example, vocabularies of complaining like ‘moaning’, ‘whinging’, or ‘grumbling’
foreground the subject side of complaining implying that the complainer may be the
kind of person who is inclined to easily find fault with others. This, in turn, may lead to
their complaints being dismissed or taken less seriously (Edwards, 2005). When disputed
by interactants, lexical choices reveal themoral work they do in the adjudication of blame
or wrongdoing. For example, establishing whether a suspect ‘pushed’ an alleged victim,
or whether the victim ‘fell’, has implications for the suspect’s culpability in and
seriousness of an offence (Stokoe, 2010). Thus, lexical choices constitute an important
resource for accomplishing moral work and, as we show in our analysis, the choice
between formulating a course of action as ‘persuading’ or ‘convincing’ illuminates the
moral accountability of influencing another when this means infringing their autonomy.
In sum, DP’s approach to the study of the psychological thesaurus diverges from
conceptual, semantic, or etymological analyses of psychological predicateswhich ‘tend to
aim for coherence, as if the word’s meaning was always that whole package, scenario and
all, and it all gets wheeled out for use on each occasion’ (Edwards, 1999, p. 281 emphasis
in original). Instead of asking what psychological predicates mean, discursive psychol-
ogists are interested in what they actually do in interaction. In line with DP’s focus on
action orientation and rhetorical use of psychological vocabularies, we explore what
individuals do with SI vocabularies. In particular, we are interested in the moral work
accomplished through SI categories and how their flexibility allows influencers to
distance themselves from potentially objectionable actions.
Data and method
The data comprise naturally occurring face-to-face and telephone conversations, in British
English, from both domestic and institutional settings. To assemble our collection, we
undertook an extensive search through data corpora that were available to us, comprising
a total of over 100 hours of interactions recorded in theUnitedKingdom.We identified 46
cases1 in which SI vocabularies were spontaneously employed (rather than elicited).
These cases are taken from across 11 different settings (see Table 1) which strengthens
and widens the applicability and relevance of our findings.
Our search, which yielded 46 cases, was conducted as follows. We initially looked for
spontaneous uses of ‘persuade’ and other forms of this lexeme. The search yielded 15
results. We then expanded the search to two other SI categories which are often
associatedwith persuasion: ‘convince’ and ‘changing [pronoun]’s mind’ which extended
our collection by 26 additional cases. Finally, we identified five further cases by extending
1While we often observed that speakers engaged in attempts at influencing others, they rarely used SI categories to formulate
their own actions towards co-present parties.
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our search to include vernacular SI categories and phrases. Table 2 provides a concise
overview of our collection which comprises formulations of social influence in the 1st
person (e.g., ‘I’ve been trying to persuade him’), the 2nd person (e.g., ‘you could persuade
him’), the 3rd person (e.g., ‘she’s going to try and persuade me’), as well as impersonal
formulations (e.g., ‘it took a lot of persuading I think really’).
For each data corpus, ethical approval had been received at the time when the data
were collected. The corpora have been assembled, stored, and used in accord with The
British Psychological Society’s (2014) guidelines for human research ethics. We
anonymized the data by replacing identity-related information with equivalent
pseudonyms. We transcribed the extracts using the Jefferson (2004b) system for CA
that captures the prosodic, phonetic, and sequential features of talk-in-interaction. We
examined the data using discursive psychology (Wiggins, 2017) and conversation analysis
(Sidnell & Stivers, 2013) which are inductive methods for analysing naturally occurring
talk-in-interaction. DP and CA exhibit a high degree of compatibility which allows for the
transfer and application of analytic principles and empirical findings across both analytic
frameworks. The analysis of each extract focused on the actions accomplished by the
speakers, as well as the activities in which they were engaged. We also scrutinized the
design of turn constructional units, turns at talk, and sequences of turns through which
the actions and activities were accomplished. Finally, we noted relevant aspects of word
selection and use of membership categories. Our analysis follows CA-underpinned DP
standards for methodological integrity and rigour (Huma et al., 2020). We adopted an
iterative analytic strategy, comprising several rounds of analysis in which we focused on
Table 1. Overview of the settings where the data were recorded
Settings Count
Incoming and outgoing calls to mediation services 18
Hostage negotiations with people in crisis 9
Police interrogations of suspects 4
Business-to-business ‘cold’ calls 3
Students’ mealtime interactions 3
University tutorials 3
Incoming calls to environmental health services 2
Antisocial behaviour unit meetings 1
Incoming telemarketing calls 1
Mediation meetings 1
Speed dating interactions 1
Table 2. Overview of the collection of social influence categorizes
Terms or phrases Count
Persuade/persuaded/persuading/persuasion 15
Change/changing/changed my/your mind 15
Convince/convinced/convincing 11
Put a bit of pressure on 1
Talked me round 1
Worked him round 1
Schmooze 1
Hoodwink 1
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each individual case, as well as on recurrent patterns across the collection. The extracts
presented in this paper are the clearest illustrations of the practices we found in our
collection. The analysis abstains from speculating about what participants’ talk could
reveal about what they may be thinking or feeling and, instead, explicates what they are
doing as evidenced by participants’ displayed orientations towards those actions.
Analysis
The analysis has been divided in three sections. First, we take a close look at the meaning-
in-use of ‘persuasion’. We show how participants treat persuading others as problematic
because it infringes the persuadees’ rights to make autonomous decisions. Next, we turn
to ‘convince’ and ‘change somebody’s mind’ – two SI categories that have traditionally
been compared and contrasted with persuasion. We find that the situated use of these
categories fails to support theoretical accounts of their meaning as outlined in section 1.1.
Finally, we explore the situated deployment of two terms (‘schmooze’, and ‘hoodwink’)
that do not appear in psychological theory or experimentation at all. Our exploration of
these categories provides insights into participants’ practices for managing the moral
accountability of influencing others.
‘Persuading’
In Extract 1, a prospective client (C) calls family mediation to request an information
assessmentmeeting (IAM) as part of a court agreement.While the IAM (referred to in lines
2–3 as ‘that firstmeeting’) is court-mandated, C is not required to continuewithmediation
beyond thismeeting. Prior to line 1,which occurs approximately 12 minutes into the call,
the mediator (M) collected background information about C’s case, learning that she is
separated from her ex-partner John with whom she has a one-year-old baby boy. John has
been banned from contacting C, due to a history of domestic abuse.
Extract 1 FMNE 1, Outgoing family mediation call
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Before focusing on lines 14–15, where our target words are uttered, we start by
describing the interactional context inwhich the term is deployed. Our analysiswill show
that the discursive environment of the term ‘persuade’ elucidates the intersubjective
meaning-in-use ascribed to the term by the participants. To clarify, by ‘meaning-in-use’ we
understand the occasioned inferences that are demonstrably indexed by the situated use
of ‘persuade’ (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1986). Following on, the rest of the extracts in this
section will illustrate a similar pattern, thus providing evidence for the recurrent,
systematic, albeit interactively occasioned use of the term.
Prior to line 1, M has described what will happen at the IAM. She is getting close to
the end of her exposition, as signalled by the turn-initial ‘U::hmwell’ (Schegloff, 2010)
and the summarizing phrase ‘all of that’ (line 2). In line 3, M produces an upshot
(Heritage&Watson, 1979) of her account highlighting that the IAM is ostensibly aimed
at enabling C to judge whether mediation is suitable for her situation. M’s self-repair
(lines 6–7) from ‘whether or not mediation uh::m might be uht possibl:e’ to ‘uh:::
m.HHHh pkt uht possibly suitable for you:.’ invites C to appraise the option of
continuing with mediation not in absolute terms – whether her case is ‘mediatable’
(Edwards & Stokoe, 2007, p. 11) – but in relative terms –whether she deemsmediation
to be an appropriate solution for her. M adds that ‘A:nd also: (.) you know if it’s not
suitable then (.) that’s absolutely fine too.’ (lines 8–9)which treats rejectingmediation
as the less preferred, albeit acceptable, result of the IAM. In overlap with C’s
acknowledgement (line 10), M continues with an explanation that introduces another
crucial and potentially upsetting detail (note M’s inbreath in line 12 beforementioning
John) about the IAM: C’s partner John will also be consulted about going further with
mediation. And indeed, C refrains from acknowledging this new detail and passes her
turn at the transition relevance place in line 13.
M continues her turn with an explicit response solicitation ‘A:lright?’ (line 13) which
indicates her orientation to potential resistance (Hepburn & Potter, 2011). Using an
inferential ‘So’ (Schiffrin, 1987), she provides another upshot of her whole turn-so-far ‘So
you’re not pushed into anything.’ (lines 13–14). This upshot orients to the possibility that
Cmight expect that, during the IAM, shemight be talked into signing her up tomediation,
a concernwhich she directly addresses in lines 14–15 and 17–19: ‘The- the purpose of this
meeting is not to persuade you tomediate..HHHHThepurpose of themeeting is to tell you
abou:t me:diation and a:lso about other alternatives that are open to you:’. Through the
contrast structure (Smith, 1978), which juxtaposes ‘persuading’ and ‘telling’ (note the
contrastive emphasis on ‘tell you’) themediator denies that the IAM is aimed at influencing
C. She treats persuading clients to sign up formediation as unacceptable because the latter
should independently decide to mediate. Persuading them would equate to ‘pushing’
them into a direction that benefits the mediators. By disavowing persuasion, M appears,
on the record, to uphold neutrality and refrain from influencing C, in accord with the
mediation ethos.
We will see a similar pattern of contrasting persuading with another talk-based
activity – explaining – in the next extract, also from a family mediation call. The
mediator (M) is the caller, returning amissed call from a prospective client (C)who had
left a message requesting to cancel her IAMwith a view to rescheduling it sometime in
the future. Prior to line 1, C had justified the cancellation by explaining that the issues
she is dealing with cannot be addressed through mediation. In lines 1–3, the mediator
gently corrects that assumption and thengoeson tomakeacase forCattending the IAM.
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Extract 2 FMNE 18, Outgoing family mediation call
As in Extract 1, our target predicate occupies the first part of a contrast structure ‘Cause
medi-.hh it’s not ↑our jo:b (.).HHHhh to persuade you to mediate. (.) It’s our job to explain to
youwhat the alternatives are there for you,’ (lines 7–11). The contrast structure is deployed in
anargument forC to attendan IAM. In line1,Mproducesapro formaacknowledgementofC’s
reasons for cancelling the meeting, while also working up a way to undercut it. Through the
modifier ‘it sounds like’M treats C’s account as the client’s subjectiveworked-up versionof the
situation, rather than an objective depiction of her circumstances. This framing allows
alternative accounts to be heard not as disagreements, but as different interpretations of the
situation. She goes on to contradict C’s assumption that some of her issues are not mediatable
‘youcandealwithallof theminmediation’, anassertionwhichshequalifiesbyhighlighting that
it all depends on C’s specific circumstances. The use of the common knowledge component
‘you know’ invites C to recognize what those specific circumstances are without M having to
spell themout (Stokoe, 2012). C’s agreement comes in slightly late (line 6), soM continues her
turnpast the transition relevanceplacewith anupshot ‘and that’swhy you atte:ndoneof these
assessment meetings’ (line 5). This is followed by a latched turn constructional unit (TCU)
containing anexplicit disavowal of the intention topersuadeC to signup formediation ‘‘Cause
medi-.hh it’s not ↑our jo:b (.).HHHhh to persuade you tomediate.’ (lines 7–8).M ties her denial
to the obligations and restrictions associated with the mediator professional identity, which
strengthens the credibility of her assertion (Stokoe, 2010). Furthermore, this category-based
denial extends M’s avowal for neutrality to anymediator that Cmight encounter in the future.
In the second part of the contrast structure ‘It’s our job to explain to you what the
alternatives are there for you’ (lines 10–11), M further portrays mediators as having the
obligation to support clients’ autonomy not only by presenting them with the set of
alternative solutions of their specific circumstances, but also by explaining those
alternatives to them. The choice of the verb ‘explain’ to contrast with ‘persuade’ is not
happenstance. It indexes an asymmetry, between mediator and client, not only in the
knowledge about possible options for issues the latter is dealing with, but also in
understanding the complexities of those options. C is positioned as insufficiently
knowledgeable about mediation. and, as such, her decision to cancel the meeting is
attributed to a lack of knowledge, which further undermines her rejection of mediation.
The next extract comes from a civil mediation call. The mediator (M) has contacted a
client (C) who was referred to mediation by social services in order to resolve a dispute
with a childcare organization. In the course of the call, which is occupiedwith arranging a
visit from the mediators, the client bemoans the difficulties of caring for four children,
especially for her youngest daughter who has a developmental disorder that severely
impacts her well-being to the extent that she has trouble getting proper nourishment and
‘has to be pe:rsuaded’ (line 7) to eat.
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Extract 3 EC 52 Outgoing civil mediation call
The speaker here ascribes the label ‘persuasion’ to conduct performed upon her ill
daughterwho is struggling to take in nourishment because of her developmental disorder.
The frail health of the child is described via a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) of inabilities
‘she can’t talk yet she can’t speak and she can’t hear pro:perly’ (lines 2–3). After a delayed
acknowledgement token from the mediator, the caller continues with an ‘and-prefaced’
turn (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994) that links the child’s eating and drinking difficulties to
her developmental disorder. She then explains how she deals with her daughter’s food
intake difficulties and positions herself as a responsible mother who manages the
competing concerns of ensuring the child takes in sufficient food while also not being
forced to eat (Hogg et al., 2014;Wiggins &Hepburn, 2007). She formulates the feeding as
a reluctant but unavoidable action ‘She has to be pe:rsuaded’ (line 7). The use of an
impersonal construction conveys that persuading a child to eat is not bound to this
particular mother, but to anyone with caring responsibilities. The omission of the
persuasive agent accomplishes a distancing from that action indicating reluctance to be
associatedwith it. Furthermore, the label ‘persuasion’ (unlike ‘conviction’ – see Extract 5)
indexes the daughter’s legitimate resistance to the food intake and indicates it is dealtwith
by reaching a compromise, such as feeding the child easy-to-swallow food (line 9–11).
The last extract in this section, from a call to an environmental health services helpline,
features a citizen (C) enquiring about the rules regarding bonfires.
Extract 4 EH 65 Incoming environmental health helpline call
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In lines 5–6, instead of providing the requested information about bonfire regulations,
the call taker (CT) produces a transformative answer (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010) that
conveys the undesirability of having a bonfire, indirectly challenging the caller’s
announced plan as implied by his question (Wilson, 1980). This is not the response C’s
question was projecting, a misfittedness which is adumbrated by the 0.6 gap in line 4 and
managed through the turn-initial ‘well’ (Heritage, 2015) which sets up the reply as
favouring the speaker’s and not the recipient’s perspective. CTmitigates the harshness of
her deterring move through the use of hedging ‘↑I would (.) try: an’ persuade’, smiley
voice, and the aspiration particles within ‘£bonfi(h)re£’ (Potter & Hepburn, 2010). She
also displays reluctance to deliver a dispreferred response (Bilmes, 2014) through
frequent in-turn hesitations.
In this extract, the term ‘persuade’ belongs to a hendiadic construction (Hopper,
2001), comprising two separate actions ‘trying’ and ‘persuading’ that are describing the
influence attempt. The first component accomplishes a display of the speaker’s intention
to deter C from having a bonfire, an intention further hedged through the modal verb
‘would’ that frames her aim as a hypothetical and unlikely to be attained (Edwards, 2006).
The verb ‘persuade’ further softens the force of the influence attempt positioning the call
taker as not entitled to issue interdictions on having bonfires. This is explicated in her
subsequent turn ‘I can’t stop (0.3) someone (.) having a bonfire’ followed by an account
for it (lines 16–17) both in response to C’s pursuit of his plan in lines 8 and 10. The action
of preventing bonfires is not directed at the interlocutor, but at a non-specific ‘someone’,
which further mitigates disaffiliation.
Summary. In this section, we highlighted both recurrent and idiosyncratic features of
the spontaneous use of ‘persuade’ in naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. The
meticulous examination of the fine details of participants’ talk aimed to demonstrated
that and how the situated understandings of persuasion are ‘through and through
practical accomplishments’ (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1986, p. 160); that is, they are built in and
through talk that orients to the interlocutor’s position and the interactional environment.
Across all extracts, the references to persuasion revealed that and how to persuade
somebody is either disavowed or reluctantly admitted by speakers. Importantly, the
grounds for persuasion being objectionable were located in the situated identities of the
parties-to-persuasion. Specifically, the persuadees were treated as having autonomy over
the domains of action which would presumably have been the focus of the persuasive
attempts. Persuaders were positioned as unentitled to influence the persuadees’ conduct
which would have meant curtailing their autonomy. In conclusion, by formulating some
conduct as ‘persuasion’ a speaker orients to the deontic configuration of the situation and
acknowledges the persuadee’s agency and the persuader’s lack of entitlement to direct
the former’s actions.
‘Convincing’ and ‘changing somebody’s mind’
We move now to the examination of the meaning-in-use of two other SI categories,
‘convincing’ and ‘changing somebody’s mind’, which have often been compared and
contrasted with persuasion.
The next extract features the term ‘convince’ and comes from a meeting of an
antisocial behaviour unit (ASBU). We see the chair of the meeting (C) complaining about
the lack of involvement of senior level representatives from partner institutions, which
she puts forward as the cause for the unit not operating effectively.
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Extract 5 ASBM 4, ASBU steering group meeting
The turn starting in line 1 is part of a complaint sequence in which C voices her
dissatisfaction with ASBU’s current (dis)organization. The complaint identifies the
deviation from the unit’s envisaged structure as the problematic aspect (Drew, 1998)
which is further traced back to the lack of support from senior police officers ‘But because
we don’t get the bu:y-in from the senior> officers<‘ (lines 5–6). The complaint is followed
by a collective call to action ‘we really need to try’n- an’ make it what- what it wa:s,’ (lines
8–9) which suggests that the current situation is an undesirable development that could
beundone. C’s proposed solution of getting senior police inspectors to attend themeeting
is framed as a necessary and righteous course of action ‘<You knowwe need to convince
(0.2) Paul Hou:sley and the other el pee you inspectors to be °here.°’ (lines 9–11). The
TCU-initial common knowledge component grounds the proposal in the participants’
presumed shared understanding and interpretation of the situation which enables her to
formulate the appeal as a collective rather than an individually supported course of action.
Note also how the choice in the action and place formulation ‘to be °here.°’ (as opposed
to, say, ‘to come to the meeting’) also contributes to the construction of the inspectors’
participation as the right thing to do and, by implication, their absence constitutes
culpable conduct to be remedied (Drew, 2013).
While in the previous extracts we saw how participants used ‘persuade’ in
constructions that disavowed or displayed reluctance to influence others, here, by
contrast, the speaker produces a strong appeal for getting the police inspectors to
attend ASBU meetings. In and through the complaint sequence, the speaker conveys a
strong sense of entitlement to implement her course of action, while also holding the
police officers accountable for their absence. Unlike in previous cases, the
influencees’ autonomy is not at stake because they have failed to fulfil their duties
to ASBU. Thus, based on our analysis so far we can surmise that ‘persuade’ and
‘convince’ index distinct kinds of social influence that are flexibly used to fit with
different deontic and moral rights that characterize the ostensible relationship
between influencer and influencee.
The next case features the phrase ‘change somebody’s mind’ which is often
considered synonymous with persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). The extract
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originates from a dramatic setting: a crisis negotiation between a police negotiator (N) and
a person in crisis (PiC) located on a rooftop and threatening to commit suicide. Following
prolonged resistance from PiC, we join the conversation after he had agreed to come
down and to be taken to an assessment centre. But prior to line 1, he starts backtracking by
asking N to confirm that he is not going to change these arrangements.
Extract 6 HN 10_11 Hostage negotiation
Lines 1–18 feature the negotiator claiming (lines 1–2) and then demonstrating (lines 4–
5 and 7–8) that he is committed to keeping the promises he hadmade to PiCwhich had led
him to announce that he would come down from the rooftop. With no engagement from
PiC (notice the long gaps at lines 3, 6, and 9), N changes the tack, praising PiC’s mum in
pursuit of a response from him (lines 10–11). After another long silence (line 12), PiC
announces that he is in the course of reverting his commitment to coming down. He
invokes N’s prior actions, which are ostensibly ‘winding him up’ (lines 13 and 21), as the
cause for this. By attributing the responsibility for the change in plans to his interlocutor,
PiC both manages the rational accountability of his conduct (Garfinkel, 1967) and
maintains the appearance of integrity despite reversing his position. Note also how the
formulation ‘you’re making me change my mi(h)nd.’ indexes PiC’s new position as an
independently worked out response to N’s actions. PiC also pre-empts further attempts
from N to get him to come down by implying that N’s actions have been upsetting him.
This places N in an infelicitous position, because he has inadvertently deterred PiC from
coming down.
This rhetorical effect could not have been achieved through the use of ‘persuade’ or
‘convince’ which index the influencer’s intention. PiC staying on the roof top is at odds
with N’s efforts throughout their interaction and, thus, cannot be attributed to N’s
ostensible intention. As such, changing somebody’s mind, even as a result of another
person’s influence, becomes a display of autonomy on the part of the influencee.
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‘Schmoozing’ and ‘hoodwinking’
So far, we have shown that the vernacular meaning-in-use of established SI categories –
persuade, convince, and change somebody’s mind – takes on empirical forms that differ,
markedly, from how they have been hitherto defined and conceptualized in social
psychology. Next, we bring to the forefront two other psychological predicates –
schmooze and hoodwink – that have not received any theoretical attention yet.
Extract 7 is part of a business-to-business sales call initiated by a salesperson (S) who
has contacted a prospective customer (P) to arrange a meeting to pitch him a new
multifunctional printer. Prior to line 1, P has already refused to meet and has resisted
several attempts from S to reverse his position.
Extract 7 Eplus 53, Outgoing business-to-business telesales call
As an IT consultant, P’s role is to advise the company’smanager Bob (mentioned in line
8) onwhether to invest in the newprinter based on the results of an ongoing pilot project
(referred to in lines 1–3). S’s first turn projects a hypothetical positive outcome of the pilot
projectwhich then enables him to frame theprinter purchase as ‘a good investment’ (lines
2–3). P agrees with S’s proposal and closes down this sequence. Keeping the floor, he
starts a new TCU that recycles a previous refusal of the meeting ‘as I say rather than um
meeting at the moment.h it’s quite a tentative thing,’ (lines 5–6). P explains that, in order
to go ahead with the meeting, the manager would need to be on board with the
investment, which could be accomplished via ‘schmoozing’ him. P indicates that getting
Bob to change his position and consider the investment ‘actually a good idea’ would take
some effort on his part – note the contrastive adverbial modifier (Athanasiadou, 2007;
Clift, 2001). P’s use of ‘schmooze’ also implies that hewould get Bob to take ownership of
the investment initiative, not just agree to P’s proposal. This suggests schmoozing requires
subtle and undetectable influence directed at an individual who is formally in charge of
making decisions. If effective, schmoozing leaves the influencee unaware of the
influencer’s action rendering their new position as having been arrived at independently.
The jocular undertone of ‘schmoozing’ enables P to play down the gravity of admitting
that he is considering to surreptitiously influence Bob. Unlike manipulation, which
presumes deceiving or misleading others (Billig & Marinho, 2014) for the benefit of the
manipulator, schmoozing frames the influencer’s action as an innocuous attempt, thus
alleviating its moral sensitivity.
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Handling the accountability of gaining benefits from influencing others appears to be
one of the tasks of SI categories. In the extract below, we see how this is achieved via the
use of ‘hoodwink’ coupled with non-seriousness and laughter. We are in the same
telesales settingwith a salesperson having called a school to inquire about the status of the
institution’s printer contract with a view to approaching them ‘at the right ti:me’ (line 4).
Extract 8 Tech 37, Outgoing business-to-business telesales call
In lines 6 and 8–9, the prospect informs the caller that they have a five-year printer
contract that is being paid for by the parish council. The salesperson treats this as unusual
(line 11) and then elicits more details about how this financial arrangement was made
(lines 14–15). In line 16, P responds they have ‘just managed to hoodwink them.=h.Hh’.
P’s formulation implies the parish council is not expected nor required to pay for their
printers, as they are not a ‘church school’ (line 5). She invites her interlocutor to treat her
response as non-serious through the post-positioned laughter particle (Jefferson, 1979)
which fits with ‘hoodwinking’ as an informal termwith humorous connotations implying
that the school has ‘tricked’ the parish council into paying for their printers. The turn as a
whole is designed to convey that the response should not be taken literally, but instead
understood as the prospect treating the state of affairs as an unlikely/unexpected outcome
(note also the minimizing preface ‘just managed’) (Lee, 1987). Inviting a non-serious
hearing of the explanation, the humour renders further investigation into the origins of
this financial arrangement difficult to pursue. Indeed, the salesperson receipts the answer
and moves forward by asking how long the financial arrangement has been in place. The
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humorous production of this turn is also indicative of potential delicacy associated with a
‘serious’ use of ‘hoodwink’ which would position the hoodwinker in a morally untenable
position because it would imply the use of deceitful influence (Edwards, 2007).
Discussion
This paper has employed discursive psychological to uncover the way that people use
specific lexical items – collectively the vocabulary of social influence – in real-life
interactions. Rather than defining terms like ‘persuade’ or ‘convince’ to operationalize for
experimental or other types of research, we examined their use ‘in the wild’, where they
naturally belong. Our analysis of interaction in settings including service encounters and
crisis negotiation found that SI categories are used, alongside other discursive practices and
resources (such as contrast structures, hedges,minimizers, or non-seriousness), to attend to
the accountability of influencing others. That is, we found that trying to change another
person’s stance is oriented to in and through the systematic deployment of specific, though,
for most psychologists, near-synonymous words and phrases. While all examined SI
categories acknowledge influencees’ potential or actual resistance to the courses of action
promoted by the influencers, their opposition, and implicitly the attempt to reverse it, is
constructed differently in and through the use of different formulations of social influence.
Thus, the paper is the first to provide empirical insight into how influencers manage the
acceptability of their conduct through specific SI categories that either highlight or obscure
influencees’ rights to resist the proposed courses of action.
We started by reviewing existing conceptual analyses of the semantic division of
labour within the social influence landscape and their limited insight into the flexibility
and defeasibility of the meaning-in-use of SI categories. In response to the inconsistencies
in the conceptualization of SI, our paper puts forward a methodological pathway that
enables researchers to untangle the threads of SI vocabularies and to make headway
towards an integrated understanding of how various kinds of interpersonal influence
attempts are brought off. Our empirical findings are at odds with extant reflections on the
distinction between ‘persuading’ and ‘convincing’ someone and also fail to support
treating ‘persuading’ and ‘changing somebody’s mind’ as equivalent.
While most of the parallels between ‘persuading’ and ‘convincing’ focused on
argument content and behavioural/attitudinal responses to it, our analysis revealed that
these terms index different deontic stances (Stevanovic & Per€akyl€a, 2012) within the
influencer-influencee dyad. Speakers formulated their influence attempt as ‘persuasion’
when they constructed thepersuadees as autonomous agentswho should decidewhether
to accept or reject the proposed course of action. At the same time, they oriented to their
own lack of entitlement to exert influence over persuadees. Nowhere in our collection do
we see speakers explicitly announcing they have or will persuade others. Persuasion was
treated as a violation of the deontic order and either disavowed (Extracts 1 and 2) or
presented as reluctantly implemented (Extracts 3 and 4). By contrast, when conduct was
glossed as conviction, the speaker positioned themselves as highly entitled to change
influencees’ behaviour which was depicted as transgressive.
Our analysis also uncovered that individuals do not treat persuading and changing
somebody’s mind as equivalent forms of influence. While further exploration of the
nuances of autonomy as indexed by ‘changing my mind’ versus ‘changing your mind’
would be welcome, still, our findings tentatively call into question the mainstream
conceptualization of persuasion as ‘changing somebody’s mind’. In fact, to change one’s
mind as a result of another person’s influence is treated as an agentic endeavour, the result
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of a deliberate action on the part of the influencee. While both categories of social
influence acknowledge the influencee’s independence, persuading somebody is
constructed as infringing their autonomy (cf. Kapferer, 2002), while changing their mind
allows them to retain their independence evenwhen they abandon their original position.
We also found that influencing others without their knowledge, as indexed by terms
such as ‘schmoozing’ and ‘hoodwinking’, is treated as problematic by speakers who
employ humour to neutralize the immorality of their conduct (Bergmann, 1998).
Importantly, the non-seriousness of these formulations is accomplished through the
concerted use of SI categories and other discursive practices,which provides evidence for
the situated meaning-in-use of psychological predicates (Edwards, 1999).
Overall, this paper has demonstrated that speakers orient to themorality of influencing
others and that the extent to which they hold themselves accountable depends on the
deontic configuration of the situation (i.e., who has the right to determine future courses
of action in a particular domain) and on how influencees’ resistance is dealt with. Our
findings challenge prior theoretical reflections which argued for the amorality of
persuasion (e.g., Cialdini, 1999; Diggs, 1964). We tentatively speculate that the moral
challenges with which influencers are confronted may explicate why real-life persuasive
conduct is defeasible, disguised, or concealed (Gibson & Smart, 2017; Huma et al., 2019;
Huma et al. 2020), for instance, by being packaged as advice (cf. Gass & Seiter, 2018).
Finally, we contend that we need more empirical research into social influence ‘in the
wild’ aimed at illuminating how individuals manage the moral issues associated with
overstepping deontic boundaries and curbing others’ autonomy.
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